The Indonesian archipelago is the largest island complex in the
world, stretching for more than 3,000 miles east to west. During the first
millennium C.E., the islands of Java and Sumatra had developed into a society
of advanced civilization, with goods being shipped overseas and navigable
rivers bringing the Indonesian hinterland into touch with distant markets.
From the seventh to 14th centuries, Buddhism flourished on the island of
Sumatra. In eastern Java, Hinduism prevailed in the 14th century, and in
1364, the Hindu empire conquered most of what is now modern Indonesia and
much of the Malay Archipelago. Islam arrived during the 12th century and dominated
Hinduism in Java and Sumatra by the end of the 16th century. In the 16th
and 17th centuries, both Christian and Islamic proselytizing took place in
the eastern archipelago, and both religions have large communities on the
islands today. On Bali, Hinduism still endures.
During the 17th century, Indonesia gradually slipped under the
control of the Netherlands, except for East Timor, which remained controlled
by Portugal until 1975. Under Dutch rule for 300 years,
Indonesia was developed into one of the Netherlands' richest colonies in
the world. In the early 20th century, an independence movement began in Indonesia,
led by young professionals and students, some of whom were educated in the
Netherlands. A small group of Indonesians led by independence leaders Sukarno
and Mohammad Hatta established the Republic of Indonesia on Aug. 17, 1945,
three days after Japanese who had occupied the nation in World War II surrendered
to Allied forces. This struggle for supremacy among the Japanese, the Dutch
and the Indonesians is the historical context for Pramoedya Ananta Toer's
book The Fugitive and requires greater elaboration.
Starting in 1942,
the Japanese occupied the archipelago in order, like their Portuguese and
Dutch predecessors, to secure its rich natural resources. Japan's invasion
of North China, which had begun in July 1937, by the end of the decade had
become bogged down in the face of stubborn Chinese resistance. To feed Japan's
war machine, large amounts of petroleum, scrap iron, and other raw materials
had to be imported from foreign sources. Most oil--about 55 percent--came
from the United States, but Indonesia supplied a critical 25 percent.
Although their
motives were largely acquisitive, the Japanese justified their occupation
of Indonesia in terms of Japan's role as, in the words of a 1942 slogan,
"The leader of Asia, the protector of Asia, the light of Asia." Tokyo's Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, encompassing both Northeast and Southeast
Asia, with Japan as the focal point, was to be a nonexploitative economic
and cultural community of Asians. Given Indonesian resentment of Dutch rule,
this approach was appealing and harmonized remarkably well with local legends
that a two-century-long non-Javanese rule would be followed by era of peace
and prosperity.
The Japanese
divided the Indies into three jurisdictions: Java and Madura were placed
under the control of the Sixteenth Army; Sumatra, for a time, joined with
Malaya under the Twenty-fifth Army; and the eastern archipelago was placed
under naval command. In Sumatra and the east, the overriding concern of the
occupiers was maintenance of law and order and extraction of needed resources.
Java's economic value with respect to the war effort lay in its huge labor
force and relatively developed infrastructure. The Sixteenth Army was tolerant,
within limits, of political activities carried out by nationalists and Muslims.
This tolerance grew as the momentum of Japanese expansion was halted in mid-1942
and the Allies began counteroffensives. In the closing months of the war,
Japanese commanders promoted the independence movement as a means of frustrating
an Allied reoccupation.
The occupation
was not gentle. Japanese troops often acted harshly against local populations.
The Japanese military police were especially feared. Food and other vital
necessities were confiscated by the occupiers, causing widespread misery and
starvation by the end of the war. The worst abuse, however, was the forced
mobilization of some 4 million--although some estimates are as high as 10
million--romusharomusha (manual laborers), most of whom
were put to work on economic development and defense construction projects
in Java. About 270,000 were sent to the Outer Islands and Japanese-held
territories in Southeast Asia, where they joined other Asians in performing
wartime construction projects. At the end of the war, only 52,000 were repatriated
to Java.
The Japanese
occupation was a watershed in Indonesian history. It shattered the myth of
Dutch superiority, as Batavia (the Dutch name for the city of Jakarta) gave
up its empire without a fight. There was little resistance as Japanese forces
fanned out through the islands to occupy former centers of Dutch power. The
relatively tolerant policies of the Sixteenth Army on Java also confirmed
the island's leading role in Indonesian national life after 1945: Java was
far more developed politically and militarily than the other islands. In
addition, there were profound cultural implications from the Japanese invasion
of Java. In administration, business, and cultural life, the Dutch language
was discarded in favor of Malay and Japanese. Committees were organized to
standardize Bahasa Indonesia and make it a truly national language. Modern
Indonesian literature, which got its start with language unification efforts
in 1928 and underwent considerable development before the war, received further
impetus under Japanese auspices. Revolutionary (or traditional) Indonesian
themes were employed in drama, films, and art, and hated symbols of Dutch
imperial control were swept away. For example, the Japanese allowed a huge
rally in Jakarta to celebrate by tearing down a statue of Jan Pieterszoon
Coen, the seventeenth-century governor general. Although the occupiers propagated
the message of Japanese leadership of Asia, they did not attempt, as they
did in their Korean colony, to coercively promote Japanese culture on a large
scale. According to historian Anthony Reid, the occupiers believed that Indonesians,
as fellow Asians, were essentially like themselves but had been corrupted
by three centuries of Western colonialism. What was needed was a dose of Japanese-style
seishin (spirit; semangat in Indonesian). Many
members of the elite responded positively to an inculcation of samurai values.
The most significant
legacy of the occupation, however, was the opportunities it gave for Javanese
and other Indonesians to participate in politics, administration, and the
military. Soon after the Dutch surrender, European officials, businessmen,
military personnel, and others, totaling around 170,000, were interned (the
harsh conditions of their confinement caused a high death rate, at least
in camps for male military prisoners, which embittered Dutch-Japanese relations
even in the early 1990s). While Japanese military officers occupied the highest
posts, the personnel vacuum on the lower levels was filled with Indonesians.
Like the Dutch, however, the Japanese relied on local indigenous elites,
such as the priyayi on Java and the Acehnese uleebalang,
to administer the countryside. Because of the harshly exploitative Japanese
policies in the closing years of the war, after the Japanese surrender collaborators
in some areas were killed in a wave of local resentment.
The independence
movement leaders Sukarno and Hatta agreed in 1942 to cooperate with the Japanese,
as this seemed to be the best opportunity to secure independence. The occupiers
were particularly impressed by Sukarno's mass following, and he became increasingly
valuable to them as the need to mobilize the population for the war effort
grew between 1943 and 1945. His reputation, however, was tarnished by his
role in recruiting romusha.
Japanese attempts
to co-opt Muslims met with limited success. Muslim leaders opposed the practice
of bowing toward the emperor (a divine ruler in Japanese official mythology)
in Tokyo as a form of idolatry and refused to declare Japan's war against
the Allies a "holy war" because both sides were nonbelievers. In October
1943, however, the Japanese organized the Consultative Council of Indonesian
Muslims (Masyumi), designed to create a united front of orthodox and modernist
believers. Nahdatul Ulama was given a prominent role in Masyumi, as were
a large number of kyai (religious leaders), whom the Dutch had largely
ignored, who were brought to Jakarta for training and indoctrination.
As the fortunes
of war turned, the occupiers began organizing Indonesians into military and
paramilitary units whose numbers were added by the Japanese to romushaheiho
(auxiliaries), paramilitary units recruited by the Japanese in mid-1943,
and the Defenders of the Fatherland (Peta) in 1943. Peta was a military force
designed to assist the Japanese forces by forestalling the initial Allied
invasion. By the end of the war, it had 37,000 men in Java and 20,000 in
Sumatra (where it was commonly known by the Japanese name Giyugun). In December
1944, a Muslim armed force, the Army of God, or Barisan Hizbullah, was attached
to Masyumi.
Unlike Burma
and the Philippines, Indonesia was not granted formal independence by the
Japanese in 1943. No Indonesian representative was sent to the Greater East
Asia Conference in Tokyo in November 1943. But as the war became more desperate,
Japan announced in September 1944 that not only Java but the entire archipelago
would become independent. This announcement was a tremendous vindication
of the seemingly collaborative policies of Sukarno and Hatta. In March 1945,
the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence
(BPUPKI) was organized, and delegates came not only from Java but also from
Sumatra and the eastern archipelago to decide the constitution of the new
state. The committee wanted the new nation's territory to include not only
the Netherlands Indies but also Portuguese Timor and British North Borneo
and the Malay Peninsula. Thus the basis for a postwar Greater Indonesia (Indonesia
Raya) policy, pursued by Sukarno in the 1950s and 1960s, was established.
The policy also provided for a strong presidency. Sukarno's advocacy of a
unitary, secular state, however, collided with Muslim aspirations. An agreement,
known as the Jakarta Charter, was reached in which the state was based on
belief in one God and required Muslims to follow the Islamic law code, the
sharia (in Indonesian, syariah). The Jakarta Charter was a
compromise in which key Muslim leaders offered to give national independence
precedence over their desire to shape the kind of state that was to come
into being. Muslim leaders later viewed this compromise as a great sacrifice
on their part for the national good and it became a point of contention,
since many of them thought it had not been intended as a permanent compromise.
The committee chose Sukarno, who favored a unitary state, and Hatta, who
wanted a federal system, as president and vice president, respectively--an
association of two very different leaders that had survived the Japanese occupation
and would continue until 1956.
On June 1,
1945, Sukarno gave a speech outlining the Pancasila, the five guiding principles
of the Indonesian nation: belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity,
democracy, and social justice. On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered. The
Indonesian leadership, pressured by radical youth groups (the pemuda),
were obliged to move quickly. With the cooperation of individual Japanese
navy and army officers (others feared reprisals from the Allies or were not
sympathetic to the Indonesian cause), Sukarno and Hatta formally declared
the nation's independence on August 17 at the former's residence in Jakarta,
raised the red and white national flag, and sang the new nation's national
anthem, Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia). The following day a new constitution
was promulgated.
The Indonesian
republic's prospects were highly uncertain. The Dutch, determined to reoccupy
their colony, castigated Sukarno and Hatta as collaborators with the Japanese
and the Republic of Indonesia as a creation of Japanese fascism. But the Netherlands,
devastated by the Nazi occupation, lacked the resources to reassert its authority.
The archipelago came under the jurisdiction of British Admiral Earl Louis
Mountbatten, the supreme Allied commander in Southeast Asia. Because of Indonesia's
distance from the main theaters of war, Allied troops, mostly from the British
Commonwealth of Nations, did not land on Java until late September. Japanese
troops stationed in the islands were told to maintain law and order, despite being representatives
of a defeated occupying army. Their role in the early
stages of the republican revolution was ambiguous: on the one hand, sometimes
they cooperated with the Allies and attempted to curb republican activities;
on the other hand, some Japanese commanders, usually under duress, turned
over arms to the republicans, and the armed forces established under Japanese
auspices became an important part of postwar anti-Dutch resistance.
The Allies
had no consistent policy concerning Indonesia's future apart from the vague
hope that the republicans and Dutch could be induced to negotiate peacefully.
Their immediate goal in bringing troops to the islands was to disarm and repatriate
the Japanese and liberate Europeans held in internment camps. Most Indonesians,
however, believed that the Allied goal was the restoration of Dutch rule.
Thus, in the weeks between the August 17 declaration of independence and
the first Allied landings, republican leaders hastily consolidated their
political power. Because there was no time for nationwide elections, the Investigating
Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence transformed itself
into the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP), with 135 members.
KNIP appointed governors for each of the eight provinces into which it had
divided the archipelago. Republican governments on Java retained the personnel
and apparatus of the wartime Java Hokokai, a body established during the
occupation that organized mass support for Japanese policies.
The situation
in local areas was extremely complex. Among the few generalizations that
can be made is that local populations generally perceived the situation as
a revolutionary one and overthrew or at least seriously threatened local
elites who had, for the most part, collaborated with both the Japanese and
the Dutch. Activist young people, the pemuda, played a central role
in these activities. As law and order broke down, it was often difficult
to distinguish revolutionary from outlaw activities. Old social cleavages--between
nominal and committed Muslims, linguistic and ethnic groups, and social classes
in both rural and urban areas--were accentuated. Republican leaders in local
areas desperately struggled to survive Dutch onslaughts, separatist tendencies,
and leftist insurgencies. Reactions to Dutch attempts to reassert their authority
were largely negative, and few wanted a return to the old colonial order.
The Dutch,
realizing their weak position during the year following the Japanese surrender,
were initially disposed to negotiate with the republic for some form of commonwealth
relationship between the archipelago and the Netherlands. The negotiations
resulted in the British-brokered Linggajati Agreement, initialled on November
12, 1946. The agreement provided for Dutch recognition of republican rule
on Java and Sumatra, and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch
crown (consisting of the Netherlands, the republic, and the eastern archipelago).
The archipelago was to have a loose federal arrangement, the Republic of
the United States of Indonesia (RUSI), comprising the republic (on Java and
Sumatra), southern Kalimantan, and the "Great East" consisting of Sulawesi,
Maluku, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and West New Guinea. The KNIP did not ratify
the agreement until March 1947, and neither the republic nor the Dutch were
happy with it. The agreement was signed on May 25, 1947.
On July 21,
1947, the Dutch, claiming violations of the Linggajati Agreement, launched
what was euphemistically called a "police action" against the republic. Dutch
troops drove the republicans out of Sumatra and East and West Java, confining
them to the Yogyakarta region of Central Java. The international reaction
to the police action, however, was negative. The United Nations (UN) Security
Council established a Good Offices Committee to sponsor further negotiations.
This action led to the Renville Agreement (named for the United States Navy
ship on which the negotiations were held), which was ratified by both sides
on January 17, 1948. It recognized temporary Dutch control of areas taken
by the police action but provided for referendums in occupied areas on their
political future.
The Renville
Agreement marked the low point of republican fortunes. The Dutch, moreover,
were not the only threat. In western Java in 1948, an Islamic mystic named
Kartosuwirjo, with the support of kyai and others, established a
breakaway regime called the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia),
better known as Darul Islam (from the Arabic, dar-al-Islam, house
or country of Islam), a political movement committed to the establishment
of a Muslim theocracy. Kartosuwirjo and his followers stirred the cauldron
of local unrest in West Java until he was captured and executed in 1962.
More formidable
were the dual communist influences of the revitalized PKI (the Indonesian
Communist Party) led by Musso, a leader of the party from the insurgency
of the 1920s, and Trotskyite forces led by Tan Malaka. The leftists bridled
at what they saw as the republic's unforgivable compromise of national independence.
Local clashes between republican armed forces and the PKI broke out in September
1948 in Surakarta. The communists then retreated to Madiun in East Java and
called on the masses to overthrow the government. The Madiun Affair was crushed
by loyal military forces; Musso was killed, and Tan Malaka was captured and
executed by republic troops in February 1949. An important international implication
of the Madiun insurrection was that the United States now saw the republicans
as anticommunist--rather than "red" as the Dutch claimed--and began to pressure
the Netherlands to accommodate independence demands. Even though the republican
government demonstrated it could crush the PKI at will and many PKI members
abandoned the party, the PKI painfully rebuilt itself and became a political
force to be reckoned with in the 1950s.
Immediately
following the Madiun Affair, the Dutch launched a second "police action"
that captured Yogyakarta on December 19, 1948. Sukarno, Hatta, who was there
serving both as vice president and prime minister, and other republican leaders
were arrested and exiled to northern Sumatra or the island of Bangka. An emergency
republican government was established in western Sumatra. But The Hague's
hard-fisted policies aroused a strong international reaction not only among
newly independent Asian countries, such as India, but also among members
of the UN Security Council, including the United States. In January 1949,
the Security Council passed a resolution demanding the reinstatement of the
republican government. The Dutch were also pressured to accept a full transfer
of authority in the archipelago to Indonesians by July 1, 1950. The Round
Table Conference was held in The Hague from August 23 to November 2, 1949
to determine the means by which the transfer could be accomplished. Parties
to the negotiations were the republic, the Dutch, and the federal states
that the Dutch had set up following their police actions.
The result
of the conference was an agreement that the Netherlands would recognize the
RUSI as an independent state, that all Dutch military forces would be withdrawn,
and that elections would be held for a Constituent Assembly. Two particularly
difficult questions slowed down the negotiations: the status of West New
Guinea, which remained under Dutch control, and the size of debts owed by
Indonesia to the Netherlands, an amount of 4.3 billion guilders being agreed
upon. Sovereignty was formally transferred on December 27, 1949.
The RUSI,
an unwieldy federal creation, was made up of sixteen entities: the Republic
of Indonesia, consisting of territories in Java and Sumatra with a total
population of 31 million, and the fifteen states established by the Dutch,
one of which, Riau, had a population of only 100,000. The RUSI constitution
gave these territories outside the republic representation in the RUSI legislature
that was far in excess of their populations. In this manner, the Dutch hoped
to curb the influence of the densely populated republican territories and
maintain a postindependence relationship that would be amenable to Dutch
interests. But a constitutional provision giving the cabinet the power to
enact emergency laws with the approval of the lower house of the legislature
opened the way to the dissolution of the federal structure. By May 1950,
all the federal states had been absorbed into a unitary Republic of Indonesia,
and Jakarta was designated the capital.
The consolidation
process had been accelerated in January 1950 by an abortive coup d'état
in West Java led by Raymond Paul Pierre "The Turk" Westerling, a Dutch commando
and counterinsurgency expert who, as a commander in the Royal Netherlands
Indies Army (KNIL), had used terroristic, guerrilla-style pacification methods
against local populations during the National Revolution. Jakarta extended
its control over the West Java state of Pasundan in February. Other states,
under strong pressure from Jakarta, relinquished their federal status during
the following months. But in April 1950, the Republic of South Maluku (RMS)
was proclaimed at Ambon. With its large Christian population and long history
of collaboration with Dutch rule (Ambonese soldiers had formed an indispensable
part of the colonial military), the region was one of the few with substantial
pro-Dutch sentiment. The Republic of South Maluku was suppressed by November
1950, and the following year some 12,000 Ambonese soldiers accompanied by
their families went to the Netherlands, where they established a Republic
of South Maluku government-in-exile.